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NOTE
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FAIR USE DEFENSE TO
COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING: ELIMINATING
UNFOUNDED LIMITATIONS
MANAL Z KHALIL
INTRODUCTION
As a way of fostering the development of new ideas and means of ex-
pression, the fair use provision' of the Copyright Act of 19762 limits the
scope of a copyright owner's exclusive rights.3 Section 107 of the Copy-
right Act codified the fair use doctrine as it existed at common law.'
Although an admittedly elusive concept, one definition has referred to
the doctrine as a "privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use
the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent,
notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner."' This doctrine
acknowledges the social desirability of permitting others to build upon
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Section 107 provides:
[Tihe fair use of a copyrighted work.., for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching... scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
Id.
2. Id. §§ 101-810.
3. Fair use is an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement. See H.R.
Rep. No. 1467, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5678 [hereinafter House Report].
4. "The judicial doctrine of fair use, one of the most important and well-established
limitations on the exclusive right of copyright owners, would be given express statutory
recognition for the first time in section 107." Id at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N
5659, 5678.
The creation of the doctrine in the United States dates back to Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), where Justice Story first enunciated the factors
assessed in determining fair use. Justice Story stated that the question involved the na-
ture of the two works, the extent of the copying and the economic effect of the use on the
copyrighted work. See id, at 344, 348.
5. Horace G. Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property 260 (1944). In
keeping with the Constitutional mandate to Congress to "promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts ... ," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, the fair use doctrine recognizes
the need to except certain uses of a copyright owner's work. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Distil-
ling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 233, 235
(1988).
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copyrighted works.6
Traditionally, the fair use doctrine has been viewed as a means of
maintaining flexibility in copyright law.7 Its flexibility permits courts to
adjust in accordance with the circumstances that may arise.8 The doc-
trine allows courts to exonerate uses of a copyrighted work that techni-
cally constitute copyright infringement.9
The fair use doctrine further serves as a vehicle for the First Amend-
ment.° By exempting from liability certain uses of a copyrighted work,
fair use enables the dissemination of new ideas and forms of expression to
the public."' The fair use doctrine, therefore, serves the crucial role of
maintaining a proper balance between the copyright goal of rewarding
creators (by granting them exclusive rights over their works) and the
First Amendment goal of protecting freedom of expression. 2
This common law doctrine, however, has been acknowledged to be
"the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright."' 3 Moreover, con-
gressional failure to clarify the doctrine's ambiguities upon codification
in the Copyright Act has aggravated the problem.' 4 Although Congress
6. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 n.28
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law
of Copyright, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 511 (1945)).
7. The fair use doctrine "permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to
foster." Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621
F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980); see generally William F. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in
Copyright Law 4-5 (1985) (fair use is a flexible judicial accommodation); Leon Seltzer,
Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 18-48 (1978) (same).
8. "Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable
definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own
facts." House Report, supra note 3, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5679.
9. See Dratler, supra note 5, at 235.
10. See id. at 248-52; Elliot M. Abramson, How Much Copying Under Copyright?
Contradictions, Paradoxes, Inconsistencies, 61 Temp. L.Q. 133, 150 (1988); see also infra
notes 143-47 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the First Amendment implica-
tions of the fair use doctrine).
11. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d
1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1983); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). Fair use assists in realizing the fundamental free speech
goal of permitting individuals to gather the information necessary to make knowledgeable
decisions as part of the democratic process. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 255-57; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (the basic aim of the First Amendment is to "preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail").
12. See John Shelton Lawrence, Copyright Law, Fair Use, and the Academy: An In-
troduction, in Fair Use and Free Inquiry 3, 9-12 (John Shelton Lawrence & Bernard
Timberg eds., 1989) ("The single concept through which the balancing of interests has
been most often sought is that of 'fair use.' ").
13. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); see generally 3
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.05 at 13-87 & n.5
(1992) (fair use an obscure doctrine).
14. The codification was "intended to restate the present [(pre-1978)] judicial doc-
trine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." House Report, supra
note 3, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
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intended to maintain flexibility in the fair use doctrine, its failure to pro-
vide more definitive guidelines has presented problems for the courts,
particularly in the area of commercial advertising."5
The problems with respect to commercial advertising arise primarily
from section 107(l)'s mention of the commercial nature of a use in deter-
mining its "purpose and character."' 6 The statute offers little guidance
as to the weight this factor should be given. 7 Specific reference to a
commercial use in the statute has led courts hastily to conclude that Con-
gress intended to single out this type of a use for special treatment, disre-
garding the explicit admonition not to consider this factor conclusive. 8
In addition, based on the specific statutory reference to the use's na-
ture, the Supreme Court has created a presumption of "unfairness"
where a use is commercial, 9 and consequently has compounded the
problem. This presumption has resulted in a great deal of confusion and
incoherence in determining fair use for commercial advertisements.2 °
Some courts have interpreted the presumption as a per se rule of no fair
use for commercial advertising,2' while other courts have viewed it
merely as a rebuttable presumption.' Moreover, this presumption raises
serious First Amendment questions. The Court's presumption runs afoul
of the commercial free speech doctrine by making it nearly impossible for
a commercial advertisement to qualify for fair use.' This threatens to
destroy the delicate balance within copyright law between First Amend-
ment concerns and the copyright goal of rewarding creators' endeavors.24
The existing inconsistencies in the application of the fair use doctrine
to commercial advertising has rendered this area of the law unpredict-
able.25 The importance of commercial advertising to consumers and to
the economy in general mandates the development of clear standards and
more consistent applications.26
15. See infra notes 31-67 and accompanying text.
16. Section 107(1) states that one of the factors to consider in determining fair use is
"the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes." 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988 & Supp. II
1990). Use of a copyrighted work in a commercial advertisement is regarded as a
"purely" commercial use because its sole purpose is to promote the sale of goods and
services for profit. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp.
302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938); see also Ellen S. Aho, Note, Fair Use and the First Amendment
Protect Commercial Advertising: Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Sig-
nal Corp., 17 Conn. L. Rev. 835, 842 (1985).
17. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 13, at 13-90.
18. See infra notes 62, 64 and accompanying text.
19. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
20. See infra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
25. See Dratler, supra note 5, at 341. As the law in this area currently stands, it
would be very difficult for commercial advertisers to predict whether their use is fair. See
id
26. The Supreme Court's decisions in the commercial speech area have repeatedly
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This Note discusses the applicability of the fair use doctrine to com-
mercial advertising. It analyzes the disparate and inconsistent results
that have taken and continue to take place in the courts, and proposes a
more coherent standard for determining "the purpose and character" of
commercial advertisements in evaluating a fair use defense.
Part I gives some background on the major sources of the inconsisten-
cies in application of the fair use doctrine to commercial advertising.
This Part identifies three sources for the confusion-the common law,
the Copyright Act,27 and the Supreme Court's two fair use decisions.28
The first section of Part I examines the doctrine as it existed at common
law,29 when commercial uses first acquired a disfavored status. The sec-
ond section analyzes the fair use doctrine under the Copyright Act. Part
I then discusses the confusion generated by the Supreme Court's creation
of a presumption of unfairness for a commercial use, both generally and
as it applies to commercial advertising. Part II examines the First
Amendment implications of the Supreme Court's presumption of unfair-
ness for commercial uses and analyzes the role that the commercial free
speech doctrine should play in formulating a standard for determining
fair use. This Part argues that, aside from the confusion resulting in the
lower courts, the Supreme Court's presumption is inappropriate because
it threatens to destroy the delicate balance in the copyright law between a
copyright owner's exclusive rights and the First Amendment interest in
dissemination. Part III offers a solution to this problem in commercial
advertising. The first section gives a general survey of other approaches
to determining fair use for commercial uses that are more attuned to the
basic goals of Copyright Law and the First Amendment. The second
section proposes the productive use test as the most coherent standard.
Under the productive use test, the advertiser claiming fair use must em-
ploy the copyrighted work for a different purpose than that for which it
was originally used. The last section of Part III suggests the proper pro-
cedure that should be followed in applying the productive use test to
commercial advertisements in conjunction with the other three factors of
section 107.30 Finally, this Note concludes that the fair use doctrine
should apply to commercial advertising in the same way it applies to
other types of uses-without the burden of a presumption of unfairness.
stressed the value of advertisements to consumers and, therefore, to the economy as a
whole. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York,
447 U.S. 557 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
27. See infra notes 31-67 and accompanying text.
28. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
29. An examination of the common law is necessary in understanding the current fair
use doctrine since the Copyright Act is merely a codification of the common law. See
House Report, supra note 3, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680; see also
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 13, at 13-87 ("[I]n determining the scope and limits of
fair use, reference must be made to pre- as well as post-1978 cases.").
30. For the full text of § 107(2), (3), and (4), see supra note 1.
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The Supreme Court's unwarranted presumption of unfairness where a
use is commercial should be discarded and replaced with a section 107
balancing test that looks to the actual substance of the use.
I. EXISTING INCONSISTENCIES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE FAIR
USE DOCTRINE TO COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING
A. Fair Use for Commercial Advertising Under the Common Law
Prior to the passage of the Copyright Act, courts limited findings of
fair use to non-commercial uses, reasoning that commercial uses did not
advance society's interest in access to useful information.3I A commer-
cial use generally was dismissed as "illegitimate." 32 Interpreting fair use
to apply only to works that advance science and the arts, these courts
viewed use of a copyrighted work in an advertisement as per se unfair,
and refused even to consider a fair use defense.33
A competing doctrine applied to determine fair use was the "mere
copying" rationale.' Courts applying this approach determined whether
the defendant's work provided new information to the public or whether
the defendant "merely copied" information that already existed in the
plaintiff's work.35 Although slightly more tolerant of commercial uses
than the per se approach, this doctrine similarly disfavored commercial
31. See, e.g., Wainwright Secs., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d
Cir. 1977) (fair use doctrine applicable only to works affecting the public's interest in
dissemination of information involving areas of universal concern, such as art, science
and industry); Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 431
F. Supp. 324, 326-27 (N.D. Iowa 1977) (advertising use is particular form of commercial
use that is least likely to justify a fair use defense); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (advertising is "purely" commercial
and, therefore, not deserving of fair use protection).
32. See, e.g., Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg., 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th Cir.
1970) (defendant's use of photographs of plaintiff's copyrighted decorative screen in cata-
log not a "legitimate" purpose and, therefore not fair use); Associated Music Publishers,
Inc., v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc., 141 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1944) (defendant's
use not within definition of fairness because use was for commercial purposes).
33. See eg., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. Cl.
1973) (fair use permitted only where copying is for scientific purposes); Telex Corp. v.
IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 362 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (fair use doctrine permits limited
use of copyrighted material for such purposes as book reviews, newspaper articles, or
scientific research, not profit-making); Henry Holt, 23 F. Supp. at 304 (defendant's use of
three lines from plaintiff's book in commercial advertising not fair use since the fair use
defense does not apply to commercial uses).
34. See Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.
Cal. 1956); Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Vogue Sch. of Fashion Modelling, Inc., 105
F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
35. In Conde Nast, the plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the defendant from using the
term "vogue' or past issues of Vogue magazine in the defendant's advertising. See Conde
Nast, 105 F. Supp. 325. In considering the defendant's fair use defense, the Conde Nast
court noted that the defendant copied the plaintiff's copyrighted work not to benefit the
public but to make an unearned profit. See id at 333.
Similarly in Robertson, the court held that defendant brewery's use of parts of plain-
tiff's song in its advertisement was not fair but mere copying of valuable parts of plain-
tiff's work. See Robertson, 146 F. Supp. at 798.
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advertising. In applying the "mere copying" approach to commercial
advertising, courts were more likely than not to deny fair use without
examining the other elements of the fair use doctrine.16 Thus, although
the per se approach-which deemed any commercial use unfair-and the
"mere copying" rationale-which emphasized the commercial motive in
determining fair use-may differ doctrinally, in application, both reveal
the same bias against commercial advertising.
B. The Copyright Act of 1976: A Change in Form, Not in Substance
Congress codified the fair use doctrine in section 107 of the Copyright
Act of 1976.17 Congress did not intend to change the doctrine but
merely to restate it as it existed at common law.3" In adopting the com-
mon law unchanged, however, Congress sent a mixed message to the
courts. By stating that the statute merely codifies fair use as it existed,
Congress implicitly ratified the courts' treatment of commercial advertis-
ing under the per se and the "mere copying" approaches.39 Congress,
however, also indicated that the commercial nature of a use is not dispos-
itive since only one of the four factors set forth as a guide for determining
fair use addressed the use's commercial nature." Given the conflicting
messages embodied in the statute and its legislative history, the courts
were left with no clear guidance.
1. The 1976 Act: A Source of Additional Confusion
A major source of confusion has been the statute's and legislative his-
tory's failure to indicate how the four factors of section 107 should be
balanced.4 Congress nowhere delineates how much weight should be
given to each factor or whether they are all of equal weight.42 Although
this omission was intentional,43 the result in the courts appears to have
36. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). For
a list of the elements of the common law fair use defense, see supra note 4. Neither the
Conde Nast court nor the Robertson court attempted to look at the other fair use factors.
If the primary motive was commercial gain, defendant's use was automatically deemed
unfair.
37. "Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use."
House Report, supra note 3, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
38. The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to
users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. However, the
endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in
particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute. The bill
endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but
there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute .... Beyond a very
broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applica-
ble to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on
a case-by-case basis.
Id.
39. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(l) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (text of statute at supra note 1).
41. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 13, § 13.05[A], at 13-90.
42. See id.
43. Congress intentionally left the criteria vague so as to permit "each case raising the
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been an ad hoc determination, based on each judge's subjective percep-
tion of what deserves fair use protection--a result Congress clearly did
not intend.
The Act's confusion was also the impetus for the Supreme Court's cre-
ation of contradictory precedent in the fair use area.45 Although the
Court has not ruled directly on the applicability of the fair use defense in
the context of commercial advertising, it has addressed commercial use
in other areas.16 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc,'7 the Court held that private "non-commercial" home taping of tel-
evision programs for "time-shifting" purposes constituted fair use.48 Fo-
cusing on Congress' directive to consider the commercial nature of the
use, the Court stated in dictum that "every commercial use of copy-
righted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright. ' 49 This statement
seems to imply that the first factor listed in section 107-purpose and
character of the use-should be given great weight.
The Supreme Court has also stated, however, that the fourth factor
listed in section 107-the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or the value of the copyrighted work-is "undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use. "s' Nevertheless, some courts seem to have
ignored this statement.5' Although the fourth factor is regarded gener-
ally as the most important,5" several courts have seized upon the
Supreme Court's clear disfavor" for commercial uses to categorically
deny advertisements fair use protection.-
The Copyright Act's failure to clarify the common law doctrine's am-
biguities, although intended to maintain flexibility, has generated a great
deal of uncertainty. The Act essentially has left determinations of fair
use entirely in the hands of the courts.5 This absence of clear guidance
has rendered a once equitable doctrine a tool of judicial fancy.
question [to] be decided on its own facts." House Report, supra note 3, at 66, reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
44. See Dratler, supra note 5, at 255-56 ("[D]ecisions based on balancing often turn
on the personal value systems of judges."); see also supra notes 63-67 and accompanying
text (for cases revealing the subjectivity involved in fair use decisions in the commercial
use area).
45. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
46. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561; Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-51.
47. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
48. See id. at 456.
49. Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
50. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
51. See infra note 63.
52. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 13, § 13.05[A], at 13-102.4.
53. The Court's disfavor is manifested in its creation of a presumption of unfairness
for all commercial uses. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. These courts essentially ignore the
Court's statement in Harper & Row.
55. See Abramson, supra note 10, at 154.
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2. Courts' Continued Adherence to Traditional Notions:
Perpetuating the Common Law's Inconsistencies
Although a complete reading of the Copyright Act suggests that the
commercial nature of a use is but one factor to consider,56 the ambiguity
of Congress' actions has enabled several courts to adhere to the tradi-
tional view that commercial advertising cannot qualify for fair use.57 In
contrast, other courts, relying on legislative history to clarify the statute,
have adopted the view that the commercial nature of a use is only one
factor in a four-prong balancing test.58
These two conflicting views are particularly noticeable in the courts'
treatment of commercial advertisements that are parodies.59 The Second
Circuit has consistently found that "an author is entitled to more exten-
sive use of another's copyrighted work in creating a parody than in creat-
ing other fictional or dramatic works."'6 This presumption of fair use
for works that parody does not, however, apply in the context of com-
mercial advertising.61
When confronted with a commercial use, courts have resorted to the
Supreme Court's stated disfavor for such uses. 62 They have treated the
first factor of section 107-purpose and character of the use-not merely
as a rebuttable presumption but as dispositive on the issue.63
56. See House Report, supra note 3, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5680.
57. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
59. Parody refers to a humorous work, "whose humor is derived from a mocking
imitation of other, usually serious, works." Sheldon N. Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the
Economic Rationale for Copyright, 11 Conn. L. Rev. 615, 616 (1979). For a more de-
tailed discussion of copyright protection for parodies, see generally Note, The Parody
Defense to Copyright Infringement: Productive Fair Use after Betamax, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
1395 (1984); Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 585 (1956).
Parody is regarded generally as an art form that should be encouraged. "The 'parody'
branch of the 'fair use' doctrine is itself a means of fostering the creativity protected by
the copyright law." Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d
Cir. 1983). The commercial advertisements in this category either parody other adver-
tisements or use lines from poetry, books, etc., to create satirical advertisements for their
product. See Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
60. Elsmere Music Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 745
(S.D.N.Y.) (citation omitted), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
61. See Tin Pan Apple, 737 F. Supp. 826; DC Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
62. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
63. In Tin Pan Apple, 737 F. Supp. 826, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that a Miller beer advertisement that allegedly copied parts of the Fat
Boys rap group's sound recordings, did not constitute fair use. The court found that
"appropriation of copyrighted material solely for personal profit, unrelieved by any crea-
tive purpose, cannot constitute parody as a matter of law." Id. at 83 1. Ironically, how-
ever, the court never bothered to examine whether the advertisement in fact was relieved
by a creative purpose. Instead, upon identifying profit as the primary motive, the Tin
Pan Apple court ended its analysis.
Similarly, in DC Comics, 205 U.S.P.Q. at 1178, Judge Leval held that an advertisement
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A competing interpretation of section 107 accepts commercial adver-
tisements as a valid form of fair use.6M Courts adopting this view rely on
congressional intent, as gleaned from the statutory language and legisla-
tive history, to clarify the ambiguities of the statute,65 and conclude that
the commercial nature of the use is not dispositive but merely one of four
factors to consider.66 Under this approach, the pivotal issue is not the
purpose and character of the use but the market effect on the copyrighted
work.67 Accordingly, where the use is commercial in nature but does not
affect the value of the copyrighted work, a fair use claim is accepted.
C. The Supreme Court's Unfounded Presumption of Unfairness
for Commercial Uses
1. Lack of Statutory Support
Based on Congress' explicit reference to a "commercial" use, juxta-
posed as the opposite of a "nonprofit educational" use,68 the Supreme
parodying the line "[i]t's a bird, it's a plane, it's... Crazy Eddie" was not fair use but an
unjustified appropriation for personal profit. The unreported opinion did not analyze the
fair use factors, nor indicate why the use was not a valid parody.
DC Comics and Tin Pan Apple are examples of a strong reluctance among several fed-
eral courts to accept commercial advertising as a legitimate form of fair use.
64. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d
1044 (2d Cir. 1983); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440
(N.D. III. 1991).
65. See supra notes 37, 38 and accompanying text.
66. In Consumers Union, 724 F.2d 1044, the Second Circuit held that the fair use
defense permitted a manufacturer to quote from a copyrighted Consumer Reports article
in a television advertisement for its product. Judge Timbers pointed out that although
the purpose of defendant's use was undoubtedly commercial, "this fact alone does not
defeat a fair use defense." Id at 1049. The court found that although motivated by
purely commercial concerns, advertisements also serve the purpose of informing the pub-
lic. See idL
Although Consumers Union ordinarily would serve as decisive precedent for the other
Second Circuit courts, this has not been the case. See supra notes 61-63 and accompany-
ing text. It appears that in the copyright area in general, precedent has little value. See
Abramson, supra note 10, at 165. Abramson suggests that the wide discretion given the
courts by Congress in § 107 renders judges less bound by prior decisions then they might
otherwise be. See id Judge Haight, in his Tin Pan Apple decision, did not even mention
Consumers Union. The reasons for this odd phenomena in the copyright area is beyond
the scope of this Note.
In Eveready Battery Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, the Northern District of Illinois held that
Coors' advertisement parodying the Energizer Bunny commercial was fair use. The
court noted that the commercial objective of the Coors advertisement was only one factor
to consider and disapproved of the analysis in Tin Pan Apple. See id.; see also supra note
63 and accompanying text (more detailed analysis of the Tin Pan Apple decision).
67. In Triangle Publications, 626 F.2d 1171, the Fifth Circuit held that defendant's
reproduction of a T V Guide cover in its comparative advertisement was fair use.
Stressing the fourth factor of § 107-the effect on the commercial value of the copy-
righted work-the court found no injury. See id at 1177.
68. Section 107(1) directs the courts to consider whether "the purpose and character
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes." 17 U.S.C. § 107(l) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (emphasis added) (text of
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Court, in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,69
created a presumption of unfairness for all commercial uses 0.7  This pre-
sumption, however, is overbroad and is inconsistent with a complete
reading of the statute and its legislative history.71 Section 107(1) men-
tions the commercial or nonprofit nature of a use but nowhere indicates
that any sort of presumption should apply.72 The legislative history
states that the commercial or nonprofit nature of a use is not conclusive
but merely one factor to be weighed.73 Indeed, elsewhere in the statute,
Congress explicitly states its aversion to bright-line distinctions between
nonprofit and commercial use.74
Ironically, the Supreme Court in Sony disapproved of the circuit
court's attempt to create oversimplified distinctions.7" In rejecting the
Ninth Circuit's presumption against non-productive76 fair use, Justice
Stevens admonished that "the question is not simply two-dimensional"
and that "Congress has plainly instructed [the courts] that fair use analy-
sis calls for a sensitive balancing of interests. ' 77 Although the Court ap-
peared to recognize the legislative mandate to balance the four fair use
factors, it inexplicably created a sweeping presumption against commer-
cial fair use.78
statute at supra note 1). By offering these two opposite types of uses as examples of
characteristics to consider, Congress appears to be saying that one is favored (the non-
profit educational use) and the other is disfavored (the commercial use).
69. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
70. See id. at 451.
71. See Dratler, supra note 5, at 279-85.
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988 & Supp. 111990) (text of statute atsupra note 1). In
fact, Congress' use of the word "including" in § 107(1) indicates that reference to the
commercial nature of a use is meant merely as an example of the types of characteristics
that should be examined and not as an indication of a disfavored status. 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990) defines "including" as "illustrative and not limitative."
73. "This amendment is... an express recognition that, as under the present law, the
commercial or non-profit character of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to
fair use, can and should be weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions." House
Report, supra note 3, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 (emphasis added).
74. In discussing the exclusive rights of copyright holders under § 106, Congress
stated:
The line between commercial and "non-profit" organizations is increasingly dif-
ficult to draw. Many "non-profit" organizations are highly subsidized and ca-
pable of paying royalties, and the widespread public exploitation of copyrighted
works by public broadcasters and other noncommercial organizations is likely
to grow. In addition to these trends, it is worth noting that performances and
displays are continuing to supplant markets for printed copies and that in the
future a broad "not for profit" exemption could not only hurt authors but could
dry up their incentive to write.
Id. at 62-63, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5676. Although this excerpt focuses
on Congress' reason for abandoning a "for-profit" limitation on exclusive performance
rights, its logic is equally applicable to fair use.
75. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984).
76. For a discussion of the concept of productivity in fair use, see infra notes 113-21,
142-53 and accompanying text.
77. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
78. See id. at 451.
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2. Court's Presumption is Unworkable
In addition to the Court's contradictory actions and the lack of a stat-
utory basis for its presumption against commercial fair use claims, there
are two major problems in adopting this presumption to distinguish fair
from unfair uses. First, there is the problem of "double counting." 9
The Sony Court indicated that the presumption shifts the burden of proof
from the copyright holder to the alleged infringer."° The copyright
holder, upon showing that the use was intended for commercial gain,
satisfies the burden of showing "some meaningful likelihood of future
harm"-the fourth factor of section 107.1 Examining the use's commer-
cial nature, therefore, becomes another way of determining whether the
fourth factor has been met. In effect, the copyright owner is getting
double protection in that she is able simultaneously to satisfy two prongs
of the test with one piece of evidence. This is double counting because
each factor subsequently is tallied separately before it is balanced against
the other factors.8 2
The second problem involves the ambiguity of the term "commer-
cial." 3 In Sony and Harper & Row Publishers, Ina v. Nation Enter-
prises," the term was used in two markedly different ways. 5 In the
majority opinion in Sony, Justice Stevens equated "commercial" with
money-making when he used the term as the opposite of nonprofit.8 6
Justice O'Connor, attempting to clarify Justice Stevens' definition, stated
that "[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole
motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit
from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the custom-
ary price."" Because of this ambiguous Supreme Court guidance, the
user would find it difficult to tailor his activities so as to avoid
infringement.
Moreover, the Court's definition is overinclusive. Application of either
definition to any use of a copyrighted work potentially results in a pre-
sumption of unfairness in most instances. Very few "works of author-
ship"" are undertaken with no intention of ever making money.89
79. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L
Rev. 1659, 1672 (1988).
80. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
81. Id (emphasis omitted).
82. See Fisher, supra note 79, at 1673.
83. See id
84. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
85. See Fisher, supra note 79, at 1673.
86. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
87. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
88. For something to be copyrightable under the 1976 Copyright Act it must be an
original work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
89. "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant pat-
ents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954);
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Whether it be the cancer researcher working for a university for a salary
or the commercial advertiser attempting to sell his product, both have
the same incentive-remuneration. Admittedly, the fact that the re-
searcher's money-making incentive may be secondary or tertiary as op-
posed to the advertiser's, whose profit incentive is primary, is a valid
consideration. This aspect of the commercial nature of the use, however,
was not factored into Justice Stevens' definition in the majority opinion
in Sony." Thus, it appears that Justice Stevens' definition derives from a
subjective desire to afford the cancer researcher more protection than the
commercial advertiser, not from an impartial examination of the term
commercial. Granting more protection to a cancer researcher may, in
fact, be preferable. Achieving this by manipulating the meaning of the
statute in contravention of the legislative history, however, creates confu-
sion and decreases the authoritative value of the Court's decisions in the
fair use area.91
Justice O'Connor's definition in Harper & Row 92 is equally inadequate.
According to her definition, the fact that the alleged infringer's sole mo-
tive is money-making is inconclusive.9" Justice O'Connor defined com-
mercial as a form of exploitation where the user profits without paying
the customary price. 94 Rather than clarifying Justice Stevens' interpreta-
tion, however, this definition creates further confusion. First, the whole
purpose of the fair use doctrine is to allow the use of others' works with-
out requiring that a fee be paid. 9" Including a failure to pay the "custom-
ary price" as part of the definition of commercial is therefore circular.
Second, Justice O'Connor's definition of commercial has the same short-
coming as Justice Stevens' definition-very few activities in the area of
copyright are undertaken with no intention of earning a profit.96 The
copyright law was enacted to give people the incentive to create, and a
see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted)
("Many uses § 107 lists as paradigmatic examples of fair use, including criticism, com-
ment, and news reporting, are generally conducted for profit in this country, a fact which
Congress was obviously aware when it enacted § 107."); Abramson, supra note 10, at 155
("To disfavor uses for profit may be to disfavor virtually all uses of copyrighted
material.").
90. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450-51
(1984).
91. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 5, at 341 ("Failure to adhere to Congress' plan-so
well illustrated by the Supreme Court's Sony and Nation Enterprises 'presumptions'-will
only sow confusion and uncertainty in the lower courts."). This effect is evident also in
the lower courts' refusal to abide strictly by the Court's presumption of unfairness for all
commercial uses. See supra notes 64-67.
92. 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
93. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 87.
94. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
95. Fair use "is the class of uses for which copyright owners must license their mate-
rial whether they choose to or not and receive nothing for such licensing." T. Brennan,
Harper & Row v. The Nation: Copyrightability and Fair Use, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Anti-
trust Division, Economic Policy Office Discussion Paper, 12-18 (1984).
96. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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large part of that incentive is monetary.97 Thus, in application, the
"profit" and "customary price" components of Justice O'Connor's test
are ineffective in defining a commercial use.98
Moreover, a literal application of this presumption to commercial ad-
vertising could result in a categorical exclusion of commercial advertise-
ment from fair use protection. Given that a partially commercial use is
presumptively unfair, as Sony and Harper & Row indicated, commercial
advertisements, which arepurely commercial in nature, should expect no
protection.99 It would hardly be a leap in logic for lower courts to con-
clude that such uses are per se unfair. This result clearly would be anti-
thetical to congressional intent."°°
II. THE ROLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN FORMULATING A
PROPER STANDARD
A. Fair Use: The Compromise Between the Copyright Law and the
First Amendment
The formidable barrier that the Supreme Court has erected for com-
mercial advertisements seeking fair use protection undermines the pur-
pose of the fair use doctrine. The fair use doctrine traditionally has been
considered a means of resolving the tension in copyright law between the
desire to reward creators and the need to disseminate information and
ideas to the public.'' By excepting certain uses from the owner's exclu-
sive control, the fair use doctrine permits greater dissemination, thus
resolving First Amendment concerns. 0
The Court's presumption of unfairness for commercial uses threatens
to destroy this delicate balance in the copyright law. Although the Court
has not held that purely commercial uses can never be fair use, its pre-
sumption of unfairness in effect accomplishes the same result. The
Court's presumption places an undue burden upon the user to show that
her work in fact does not affect the potential market for or the value of
the copyrighted work.' 03 The difficulty of proving this negative is both
unjust and unnecessary in light of the Supreme Court's commercial free
97. See supra note 89.
98. See Fisher, supra note 79, at 1673.
99. Use of a copyrighted work in a commercial advertisement is regarded as a
"purely" commercial use because its sole purpose is to promote the sale of goods and
services for profit. See, eg., Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F.
Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (pamphlet intended to promote sale of defendant's prod-
uct advanced a purely commercial purpose); Aho, supra note 16, at 842 (advertising
purely commercial).
100. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
101. See David E. Shipley, Conflicts Between Copyright and the First Amendment After
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 983, 991; Aho,
supra note 16, at 837.
102. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (text of statute at supra note 1).
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speech jurisprudence."°
B. Supreme Court's Presumption Ignores the Commeicial
Free Speech Doctrine
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,"0 5 the Supreme Court held that a state cannot prohibit
pharmacists from advertising their prices and thereby established the
modem commercial free speech doctrine." The Court found that the
free flow of commercial information is necessary to enable the public to
make knowledgeable decisions in a free market economy.10 7 The
Supreme Court's commercial free speech doctrine demonstrates that
commercial advertising can serve as important a role in disseminating
information as any non-commercial activity.108
By making it difficult for commercial advertisements to qualify for fair
use, the Court ignores its own doctrine of commercial free speech. 09 Be-
cause the very purpose of the fair use doctrine is to promote greater dis-
semination of information to the public and because commercial
advertisements further this goal, advertisements' 10 claiming fair use
should not be saddled with a nearly unrebuttable presumption."'
104. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (commercial speech is valuable and deserving of protection
under the First Amendment).
105. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
106. See id. at 763.
107. See id.; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding that regulation that completely bans electric
utility from advertising violates First Amendment).
108. The Virginia State Board Court stated that the consumer's interest in the content
of commercial advertising "may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day's most urgent political debate." Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 763; see also Con-
sumer Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir.
1983) (defendant's use of favorable copyrighted language from a Consumer Reports arti.
cle in its advertising fair use because served the important educational function of inform-
ing the public); Wolff v. Institute of Elec. and Elecs. Eng'rs, 768 F. Supp. 66, 68
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[Ihe fair use doctrine will not apply absent a significant public inter-
est justifying limits on the copyright holder's rights.") (quoting Strauss v. Hearst Corp., 8
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1832, 1835 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
109. Although the Court addressed the First Amendment in Harper & Row, its discus-
sion was with respect to using the First Amendment as fall-back defense where the use is
found unfair. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-
60 (1985). The Court has never addressed the First Amendment problem that arises as a
result of the creation of a presumption of unfairness for commercial uses.
110. This conclusion assumes that the advertisement claiming fair use meets all of the
Supreme Court's commercial speech requirements, namely that it "is neither misleading
nor related to unlawful activity." Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
111. The Court's stated reason for the presumption is that commercial uses usually
involve injury to the copyrighted work's market. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). This reasoning, however, confounds the first
and the fourth factors of § 107 and, in effect, gives the copyright owner the benefit of
meeting two of the § 107 factors simultaneously. As discussed earlier, this type of
double-counting gives an unfair advantage to the original user. See supra notes 79-82 and
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Although the commercial free speech doctrine should not become a fifth
factor in the fair use analysis or an alternative defense when a fair use
claim fails, its concerns and underlying goals should be considered in
analyzing the nature of the use." 2
III. TOWARDS A COHERENT FAIR USE STANDARD FOR
COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING
A. Alternative Approaches to Assessing Fair Use for Commercial
Advertising
In an effort to find a more workable standard, several commentators
have posited various alternative tests to determine fair use. These pro-
posals reflect the important values underlying the copyright law and
merit discussion.
1. The Productive Use Test
The productive use test is based upon the fundamental premise of
copyright-to encourage new creations for the benefit of society. 113 Pur-
suant to this scheme, a use of a copyrighted work that is deemed "fair"
would seek to encourage creativity.
According to Professor Seltzer, fair use should not be permitted for the
"mere reproduction" of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic pur-
pose-to make, what he calls, an "ordinary" use of it. 114 Instead, fair use
should be a "use that is necessary for the furtherance of knowledge, liter-
ature, and the arts AND does not deprive the creator of the work of an
appropriately expected economic reward." ' 5
Similarly, Judge Leval's productive use approach focuses on the utili-
tarian goals of copyright law as a whole.1" 6 His test requires that a use
accompanying text. Whether a use injures the copyrighted work's market must be de-
cided and tallied separately as a preliminary step in the balancing process if the statuto-
rily-mandated balancing test is to retain any validity.
112. Some commentators have argued against allowing the First Amendment to play a
role in fair use analysis for fear it will usurp copyright law altogether. They contend that
all commercial advertising can be said to inform the public, thus making it difficult to
determine where the line should be drawn. See e.g., Note, Fair Use and the First Amend-
ment Protect Commercial Advertising: Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v.
General Signal Corp., 17 Conn. L. Rev. 835 (1985); Note, Consumer's Union of United
States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp.: Commercial Free Speech and the Fair Use Doctrine
of Copyright, 16 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 85 (1984). However, if First Amendment concerns are
integrated into only the first factor, the other three factors will serve as a check. Thus,
only those advertisements that inform, do not take more from the copyrighted work than
is necessary, and do not injure the copyrighted work's market in any meaningful way are
deemed fair use. See infra notes 143-76 for a more developed presentation of this
proposal.
113. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
114. Leon Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 24 (1978).
115. Id
116. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1110
(1990).
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meet two basic criteria: it must "serve[ ] the copyright objective of stim-
ulating productive thought and public instruction without excessively di-
minishing the incentives for creativity."' 17
In analyzing the first factor of section 107-the purpose and character
of the use-Judge Leval argues that for fair use to be a viable defense the
purported use must be justifiable.118 Upon determining that justification
exists, the question still remains as to the strength of that justification. " 9
According to Judge Leval, "[T]he answer to this question turns primarily
on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative."'20
A use that merely takes the copyrighted work and "repackages" it can-
not qualify as a transformative use.' 2'
2. The Market Factor Approach 122
The market approach parallels Judge Leval's but adds a third criteria.
According to Professor Gordon, for a use to qualify as fair, three require-
ments must be met: "(1) defendant could not appropriately purchase the
desired use through the market; (2) transferring control over the use to
defendant would serve the public interest; and (3) the copyright owner's
incentives would not be substantially impaired by allowing the user to
proceed."' 123 In Professor Gordon's view, the "productive" aspect of a
use is merely a "secondary indicator" that the three primary require-
ments have been satisfied. 124
By allowing the copyright owner to obtain as large a share of the profit
as she can through negotiations with the proposed user, 12 5 the market
approach recognizes the copyright owner's property interests. Thus, so
long as the copyright owner is willing to transfer her rights through sale
or licensing, the concerns of the fair use doctrine are not implicated. 26
If the owner, however, is not interested in profit and has an "anti-dissem-
ination motive[ ],,,127 her refusal to license the use "out of a desire unre-
lated to the goals of copyright" constitutes a market failure, which
strengthens the argument for a finding of fair use.128
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1111.
119. See id.
120. Id. To be transformative a use must be productive and must employ the copy-
righted work in a "different manner or for a different purpose" than the original. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4901)).
122. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982).
123. Id. at 1601.
124. See id. at 1652-55.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1615-17.
127. Id. at 1632.
128. See id. at 1632-34.
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3. Working Within the Framework of Section 107
Professor Dratler's approach attempts to work within the framework
of section 107.29 Emphasizing the dual copyright goals of "fostering
creativity and encouraging wide dissemination and use of creative
works," he argues that section 107 provides adequate guidance for
achieving these goals.1 30 Professor Dratler contends that for the statu-
tory scheme to work as intended, courts must respect congressional man-
dates.131 One such mandate is for the courts to consider all four specific
factors and not choose amongst them as they please.132 To this end, Pro-
fessor Dratler urges that courts keep the four factors analytically distinct
and examine separately any additional considerations, such as bad
faith.133
Finally, Professor Dratler insists that a court must conduct a proper
balancing of all four factors, along with any other factors that it finds
relevant.1 34 This balancing, he argues, is crucial both to reach a reasoned
conclusion in each case and to provide a consistent basis for comparing
fair use decisions based on differing facts.' 35  Professor Dratler's propo-
sal concludes by admonishing that the failure to adhere to Congress'
plan-"so well illustrated by the Supreme Court's Sony and Nation En-
terprises 'presumptions' "-will inevitably lead to confusion and
incoherence.
1 36
4. The Utopian Notion 137
Unlike Professor Dratler, Professor Fisher sees no hope for the current
statutory scheme or the Supreme Court's fair use decisions.' 38 Rejecting
both as beyond redemption, Professor Fisher offers two reconstructions
of the fair use doctrine: one that strives to attain economic efficiency and
another that seeks "a vision of the good life," or more specifically, "a
substantive conception of a just and attractive intellectual culture."' 39
Professor Fisher's second reconstruction is not confined to the utilitarian
copyright considerations of other commentators." ° Instead, it goes be-
yond utilitarianism altogether and includes creativity as an element of
personal fulfillment and recognition of entitlement and dessert.' 4 ,
129. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43
U. Miami L. Rev. 233 (1988).
130. Id at 245-47.
131. See id at 288-89.
132. See ia at 341.
133. See ia
134. See iL
135. See id.
136. Id. at 341.
137. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 1659 (1988).
138. See id
139. Id at 1744.
140. See supra notes 113-36 and accompanying text.
141. See Fisher, supra note 137, at 1744-62.
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Recognizing that such an expansive overhaul of the statute is unlikely
in the near future, Professor Fisher also proposes a more "modest" ap-
proach. Under this approach, he calls for the courts to weigh the extent
to which a finding of fair use would decrease the incentive to create copy-
righted works against the social good of the use.14 2
B. The Productive Use Test as the Most Coherent Standard
That copyright law has been successful in accommodating First
Amendment concerns is due mainly to the fact that both constitutional
doctrines share similar goals and purposes.143 One of the basic purposes
of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, and therefore the Copyright
Act,' 44 is to encourage creative endeavors in order to benefit the pub-
lic. 145 This stimulates contributions to the "marketplace of ideas,"'
146
thus furthering First Amendment concerns as well. Therefore, in order
to maintain the harmony between copyright and the First Amendment, a
proper fair use standard should look to the purposes of copyright as a
basis. 1
47
At the heart of the copyright law is the concept of productivity. 148
Every aspect of copyright seeks to encourage production of new works.
142. See id. at 1780-83. Social good of a use would include the increased availability of
creative works, greater public access to "information and debate on matters of public
importance," and the availability of materials to teachers for their courses. Id. at 1782.
Professor Fisher specifically excludes consideration of customary practice and the user's
good or bad faith. See id. at 1783 n.533.
143. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. A thorough discussion of the interplay
between the First Amendment and copyright law is beyond the scope of this Note. For a
comprehensive discussion of this issue, see generally David E. Shipley, Conflicts Between
Copyright and the First Amendment After Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enter-
prises, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 983, 991-95; Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amend.
ment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1180
(1970); Celia Goldwag, Note, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 79
Colum. L. Rev. 320 (1979); Jeffrey Oakes, Note, Copyright and the First Amendment, 33
U. Miami L. Rev. 207 (1978); Leonard W. Wang, Note, The First Amendment Exception
to Copyright: A Proposed Test, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 1158.
144. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides the authority for Congress' enactment of the
Copyright Act.
145. "The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are... intended to moti-
vate the creative activity of authors and inventors." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimu-
late artistic creativity for the general public good.").
146. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (citation omitted).
147. The Supreme Court in Sony recognized the need to maintain this harmony when
it concluded that an interpretation of the Copyright Act necessarily "involves a difficult
balance between the interests of authors.., in the control and exploitation of their writ-
ings . . . on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas,
information, and commerce on the other hand." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1985).
148. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress "[tlo promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
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One salient example is the idea/expression dichotomy.,49 By affording
copyright protection only for expressions and not for ideas, the law seeks
to encourage creators to build upon the ideas of others, thereby produc-
ing new works. Section 107's listed examples of fair use suggests a legis-
lative intent to permit this privilege only for productive uses.so
Similarly, the incentive built into the copyright law rewards production
of new works of authorship. Therefore, the focus of the "purpose and
character" factor of section 107 should be whether the allegedly infring-
ing use furthers the productive goals of the copyright law.
A "productive" use is one that intends to build upon and perform
functions different from the copyrighted work.' Such a use does not
merely reproduce the original copyrighted work and use it for its "ordi-
nary" purpose.' In determining whether a work falls within a favored
"productive" category, courts may consider the degree of originality5
and the value of the use to the public. 54
Applying the productive use standard to commercial advertising best
satisfies the aims of the copyright law. By requiring that an advertise-
ment that takes from a copyrighted work add originality and serve a pub-
lic interest, this standard comports with goals that underlie both the
copyright law and the First Amendment. The basic rationale for the
Supreme Court's commercial free speech doctrine is that commercial
speech, in particular advertising,'" s serves the important public service of
informing consumers.' 56 For an advertisement that uses a copyrighted
work to satisfy this standard it must offer new information-a central
requirement of the productive use test. 57
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
149. See I Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 1. 10[B][2],
at 1-72 (1992); Goldwag, supra note 143, at 323-25.
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. 111990); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 478 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (situations listed in § 107 in which fair use is most often found have a
"common theme: each is a productive use"); Dratler, supra note 129, at 289 (the six fa-
vored categories explicitly mentioned in the statute and the additional categories de-
scribed in the House Report indicated Congress' intent to allow fair use for "productive
borrowing").
151. See Note, The Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement: Productive Fair Use
after Betamax, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1395, 1399 (1984); see also Leval, supra note 116, at
1111 (Judge Leval refers to such a use as "transformative").
152. See Seltzer, supra note 114, at 24. Such a use merely duplicates the objectives
already served by the original and, therefore, contributes nothing new to society. By
ordinary, Seltzer is referring to a use that employs the copyrighted work for its inherent
or intended purpose. See id
153. See Dratler, supra note 129, at 298.
154. See supra notes 144, 145 and accompanying text.
155. Most of the Court's commercial free speech cases have dealt with advertising.
See eg., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
156. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
157. Commentators have argued, in the context of fair use generally, that the produc-
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C. Application of the Productive Use Test: Greater
Consistency and Predictability
In determining fair use for commercial advertisements, the courts
must weigh all four factors in section 107. A consistent procedure for
application of the productive use test, in conjunction with the other fac-
tors of section 107, must be followed.
Under the Supreme Court's fair use analysis, the first factor to be ex-
amined is the "purpose and character" of the use.'"8 At this point, if the
plaintiff shows that the defendant's use is commercial, his burden of pro-
duction is satisfied. 59 The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut
the presumption by demonstrating that the other three factors are in his
favor.
This process, however, is counterproductive. As discussed earlier,lw
the Supreme Court has stated that the fourth factor-the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or the value of the copyrighted work-is
dispositive.' 6 ' Hence, this factor should be the first examined since it is
unnecessary to go through the other three factors if market injury can be
shown under section 107(4). If analysis under section 107(4) reveals no
likelihood of an effect on the value or the potential market for the copy-
righted work, the court would then examine the other three factors.
The court should next examine the purpose and character of the use.
Applying the productive use test, the court should ascertain whether the
defendant's advertisement performs a different function from that of the
copyrighted work. 62 If the advertisement does not pass the productive
use test, there is, once again, no need for the court to proceed and con-
sider the other factors. An advertisement that neither serves a different
function nor adds to the copyrighted work in some way cannot be con-
sidered fair.'63 Such an advertisement does not meet the ultimate goal of
tive use standard is insufficient because it excludes uses that serve an important, socially
useful purpose without being productive, simply by making the copyrighted work avail-
able through reproduction. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the
Fair Use Doctrine, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1137, 1143 (1990). This concern, however, does not
apply to advertisements. Rarely will an advertisement merely duplicate without any nar-
ration or explanation since it must somehow connect the copyrighted material with its
service or product. These commentators' concerns pertain mostly to the classroom set-
ting where teachers may need to reproduce whole books for instructional purposes. See
id. Another limitation of the productive use standard is its failure to take into account
minor everyday uses which in no way affect the value of, or the market for the copyright
holder's work, such as the photocopying of an old newspaper clipping to send to a friend.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 481-86 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun dealt with this problem by simply creating
a categorical exemption for such de minimus "infringement." See id. Once again, how-
ever, this problem does not apply in the advertising context.
158. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-51 & nn.30, 32.
159. See id.
160. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
161. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
162. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
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informing the public because the information is already available.'6
If the advertisement meets the productive use test, the court must eval-
uate the remaining two factors. The amount and substantiality of the
portion used16 1 should be the next factor considered. Section 107(3) as-
sesses the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyright work as a whole.1 66 This factor should be used to further re-
fine the findings under the first two factors discussed. 6 ' A use that takes
a substantial amount from the original, whether qualitatively or quantita-
tively, would have difficulty showing sufficient originality.' 61 Such a use,
moreover, is likely to affect the value and potential market of the copy-
right holder's work. The concerns of this factor, therefore, are inevitably
considered under the analysis of the purpose-and-character and market-
effect factors.1 69 Hence, an examination of the degree and substantiality
of the portion used merely serves as a double-checking mechanism.
Finally, the court should consider the nature of the copyrighted
work.170 This factor takes into consideration the varying degrees of pro-
tection that is given to different types of works.'' Analysis under this
factor usually entails categorizing the copyrighted work "on the spec-
trum between fact to fancy." 17 2 If an advertisement borrows from a fac-
tual or informational work, fair use is more likely to be found.' If an
advertisement borrows from a poem or a movie, however, the fair use
hurdle will be more difficult to overcome."7 4 In this case, the degree of
originality is more closely scrutinized. The requisite level of creativity,
therefore, will be higher.
The rationale for the differentiation between types of copyrighted
164. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (text of statute at supra note 1).
166. See iL
167. To summarize, the two factors discussed were the market effect factor under
§ 107(4) and the "purpose and character of the use" factor under § 107(1). See supra
notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
168. To show sufficient originality, a use must be creative and imaginative. A use that
takes the essence of another's work leaves little room for such originality. See Dratler,
supra note 129, at 310-12.
169. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1), (4) (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
170. Id § 107(2).
171. In assessing the nature of the copyrighted work the court "may consider...
whether the work was creative, imaginative, and original." MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677
F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981).
172. Dratler, supra note 129, at 303-09.
173. See eag., Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir.
1984) (creative works are entitled to more protection than those that are informational);
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d
Cir. 1983) (finding plaintiff's magazine "primarily informational rather than creative"
widens scope of permissible fair use). See generally Goldwag, supra note 143, at 326 n.42
("[Clourts have tended to be most receptive to unauthorized use of educational, scientific,
and historical works.").
174. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40
(1984).
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works is, once again, the public interest.'75 In the case of a factual work,
the copyright owner merely compiles facts already in the public domain,
albeit in fragmented form; whereas, with creative or expressive works,
the author is contributing his own ideas and original thoughts to the
"marketplace of ideas." This distinction has led courts to conclude that
this type of "author" deserves more protection, with the ultimate reason
being to encourage others to undertake the extra effort involved in the
creation of such works. 1
76
CONCLUSION
The proper standard for assessing the "purpose and character" of a
commercial advertisement asserting the fair use defense must be based on
the general policy underlying the copyright law. The productive use
standard best meets this criterion by requiring that a use build upon the
copyrighted work in a creative and informative manner, without causing
any meaningful harm to the copyright work's market. Under this stan-
dard, the original copyright owner continues to reap the benefits of his
creation while the user is rewarded for his added work. The ultimate
beneficiary is the public, which now has two sources of information as
opposed to one.
The productive use standard further satisfies First Amendment con-
cerns by allowing commercial advertisements to qualify for fair use. This
standard should displace the Supreme Court's presumption of unfairness
where a commercial use is involved. Unlike the Court's presumption, the
productive use standard incorporates the commercial free speech doc-
trine, and, therefore, maintains the delicate balance between the copy-
right goal of rewarding creators and the First Amendment objective of
protecting freedom of expression.
175. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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